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COMMENTS
VIRGINIA'S "WAR ON WOMEN:" HOW FORCING WOMEN
TO HAVE AN ULTRASOUND BEFORE ABORTION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Alison B. Linas
1. INTRODUCTION
Women's rights have come a long way in the last hundred years. In
1920, women won the right to vote with the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. In 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, mandating that
employers pay women the same salary as men for the same job.2 In 1965,
the Supreme Court of the United States legalized birth control for married
couples. 3 Finally, in 1972, the Supreme Court recognized a woman's right
to have an abortion. None of these milestones has come without contro-
versy, and now the controversy continues.
In the last several years, state legislatures around the country have started
trying to chip away at abortion rights. States have passed various forms of
legislation mandating such things as a twenty-four hour waiting period be-
tween consultation and abortion, discussions on fetal pain and potential
negative psychological effects on the mother, and ultrasounds before an
abortion can be performed.' Though not always readily apparent, these
laws are all meant to erode the rights given and upheld by the Supreme
Court. Most of these laws may also be unconstitutional.7
Virginia is one of the states that recently jumped on the anti-abortion
bandwagon. In the 2012 legislative session, conservative Republicans
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
2 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
5 See generally Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib RFU.pdf; Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: An
Overview of Abortion Laws, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib OAL.pdf.
6 Overviewi ofAbortion Laws, supra note 5.
7 See State Governments, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA (last visited Mar. 14, 2012),
http://prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/state-governments (click on a state to get a detailed
view of the abortion laws and regulations in that state and an analysis of the constitutionality of those
laws).
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gained control of the House, Senate, and Governor's mansion. With the
Republican takeover of the Legislature came support for a slew of socially
conservative legislation-including new restrictions on abortion.' Two key
pieces of legislation were introduced: a bill stating that personhood begins
at conceptiono and a bill mandating that a woman be required to have an
ultrasound before she can have an abortion." The ultrasound bill passed.12
This comment will discuss how the ultrasound bill, like similar ones in
other states, is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, requiring a woman to
undergo a medically unnecessary procedure at her own expense is an undue
burden under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.1 3 Second, the Supreme Court
has held that competent people have the right to refuse medical care. 4 By
requiring a woman to have an ultrasound, the State is depriving her of her
constitutional right to refuse care.
Part 11 of this comment will focus on the Supreme Court's role in shaping
abortion policy. Part II(A) concerns the history of abortion rights, starting
with Roe v. Wade and ending with Planned Parenthood v. Casey. I will
discuss the expansion of the right to privacy to include the right to have an
abortion, and explain the "undue burden" standard adopted in Casey. Part
II(B) will discuss the Supreme Court's recognition of a rational adult's right
to refuse medical care.
Part III will describe Virginia's new ultrasound requirement and how the
above-mentioned Supreme Court decisions affect the new bill's legality.
Part III(A) will lay out the relevant portions of the bill and discuss its legis-
lative history. Part III(B) will analyze the bill through Casey's undue bur-
den lens. This section will conclude that the bill creates an undue burden
on the women it purports to help for a variety of reasons. First, ultrasounds
before first trimester abortions are medically unnecessary." Second, requir-
8 Anita Kumar & Laura Vozzella, GOP Takes Control of Virginia General Assembly, WASH. POST, Jan.
11, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/gop-takes-control-of-virginia-general-
assembly/2012/01/11/glQATCdGsP story.html.
Lucy Madison, Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell Signs Virginia Ultrasound Bill, CBS NEWS, Mar. 7,
2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57392796-503544/virginia-gov-bob-mcdonnell-
signs-virginia-ultrasound-bill; see also Laura Vozzella, Virginia Republicans Push Slew of Conservative
Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/virginia-
republicans-push-slew-of-conservative-bills/2012/01/20/glQARNsXJQstory.html.
10 H.B. 1, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (not enacted), available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?ses=121&typ bil&val hbl.
H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted), available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?121+mbr+HB462.
12 Id.
13 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
14 See Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
15 See Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newvest Tactic in
Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSAL. REv. 359, 368 (2009); Overview ofAbortion Laws, supra note
2
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ing a woman to have a medically unnecessary procedure interferes with the
doctor-patient relationship. Third, the cost of the ultrasound is prohibitively
expensive to many women. 6 Finally, being forced to have a medically un-
necessary procedure and to see (and hear) the images on the screen may
cause psychological issues for the mother. Part III(C) will argue that re-
quiring a woman to have a mandatory medical procedure effectively pre-
vents her from refusing medical care, a right given to her by the Supreme
Court.17 Part IV will state the conclusion that Virginia's new ultrasound re-
quirement should be found unconstitutional because it violates both a wom-
an's right to have an abortion without an "undue burden" and her right to
refuse medical care.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. From Roe to Casey, Privacy and the "Undue Burden" Standard
1. Roe v. Wade
In 1973, the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional right of
women to have an abortion in certain circumstances.19 Eight years prior, the
Court had officially recognized the existence of a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy under the Constitution.20
This right to privacy was not found in the literal language of the Bill of
Rights, but in the "penumbras" of several of the amendments.21 The right
might also be found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.22 After expounding on the common-law history of specific instances
of constitutionally recognized privacy, the Roe Court expanded the bounds
of the definition of privacy to include a woman's decision whether or not to
5, at 1; Robin Carlysle, Ultrasound Before Abortion Not Medically Necessary, CLINICAL ADVISOR (Mar.
1, 2012), htp://www.clinicaladvisor.com/ultrasound-before-abortion-not-medically-
necessary/article/229974.
16 See Aetna, Inc., Clinical Policy Bulletin: Ultrasound for Pregnancy, AETNA.COM (last accessed Mar.
18, 2012), http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical/data/100_199/0199.html; see also Maya Dusenbery, Why
Virginia's New Mandatory Ultrasound Law Still Sucks, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 3, 2012,
http://motheriones.com/mojo/2012/03/why-virginias-new-mandatory-ultrasound-law-still-sucks.
17 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18 See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
19 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
20 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 Id. at 484-85. The right to privacy is found in the penumbras of the right of association of the First
Amendment, the prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes in the Third Amendment, the
right to security from search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the enumeration clause of the Ninth Amendment. Id.
22 Id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring); id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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terminate her pregnancy.23
In acknowledging a woman's right to have an abortion, the Court
stated that at some point the State's interest in the protection of health, med-
ical standards, and prenatal life become dominant.24 Accordingly, the Court
adopted a "first trimester" framework2 5 and determined that during the first
trimester, the State could not restrict abortions because its interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life26 was not yet compelling.27 The
State's interest grows in the second trimester, but only as to the extent that
it relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.28 After via-
bility (in other words, after the first trimester), the Court held the State is
allowed to proscribe abortion except as necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.29
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The national (and legal) abortion debate did not die with Roe. In the
next nineteen years, the Court heard several more cases dealing with nuanc-
es of state abortion laws. The decisions varied in their holdings but didn't
drastically alter interpretations of Roe.30 This all changed in 1992 with the
plurality holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey." By this time, two of the more liberal Supreme Court justices from
the Roe Court had retired, leaving the Roe holding potentially vulnerable to
being overruled.32 Based on stare decisis, the Court did not overturn Roe,
but its application was severely limited.
23 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
24 d at 154.
25 Jd at 163.
26 d at 162.
27 Jd at 163 ("the compelling point is viability").
28 Id. Examples of permissible State regulation in this area include requirements about the qualifica-
tions of the person who is to perform the abortion, the licensure of that person, and the type of facility in
which the procedure is to be performed. Id.
29 Id. at 163-64.
30 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(holding that a Pennsylvania act requiring women be advised on alternative medical assistance and child
support, requiring physicians to inform women of the negative physical and psychological effects of
abortion, requiring a second physician in the room during the abortion, and failing to provide a medical
emergency exception was unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (holding that provisions of a state ordinance dealing with such requirements as parental con-
sent, informed consent, and a 24-hour waiting period were unconstitutional); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979) (holding that a state law banning abortion where the fetus "is viable" or "may be via-
ble" is too vague).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3 Weber, supra note 15, at 361.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
4
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 16 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol16/iss1/7
VIRGINIA'S 'WAR ON WOMEN'
The Court upheld the right of a woman to have an abortion but discarded
the first trimester framework, opting instead for a more vague "viability"
standard; 34 the State's interest begins as soon as the fetus is "viable."35 In
promoting its interest, the State is entitled to take steps to ensure that a
woman's choice is "thoughtful and informed" and thus may enact rules de-
signed to show her alternatives to abortion. 6 It should be noted that in its
examples of "informed consent," the Court only mentioned alternatives to
abortion; there is no discussion of fetal age, health, heartbeat, or pain.37
Arguably the biggest change to come out of the Casey decision was the
Court's shift from the strict scrutiny analysis of abortion laws applied by
Roe to a brand-new, almost undefined "undue burden" standard.3 As it cur-
rently stands, any State action restricting a woman's access to abortion must
pass the undue burden test. An undue burden is created when "a state regu-
lation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 39 The Court declined
to explain how to apply this new standard; it merely provided "guiding
principles" in the form of examples of situations that do not constitute un-
due burdens.40 It applied this standard to the disputed Pennsylvania law and
held that requiring a woman to notify the man who supplied the sperm of
her intention to have an abortion was an undue burden,41 but that requiring
an unemancipated minor to have parental permission,42 requiring a woman
to wait twenty-four hours,4 3 and requiring the physician to inform the wom-
an about the risks of abortion and information about the fetus44 were not.
The Court further acknowledged that increased cost could become a sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman seeking abortion.45
Id. at 870; see also Weber, supra note 15, at 362-63; Caroline Burnett, Dismantling Roe Brick by
Brick The Unconstitutional Purpose Behind the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 42 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 227, 238 (2007).
35 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
36 Id. at 872
"[T]he State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that... there are pro-
cedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assis-
tance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself." Id.
38 See id. at 876-77; see also Burnett, supra note 34, at 238-39.
39Id. at 877.
40 Id. at 877 78.
41 Id. at 893-94.
42 Id. at 899.
43 Id. at 881.
44 Id.
4 5 Id. at 901.
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B. The Right to Refuse Medical Care
The Supreme Court has consistently found that a competent adult
has the right to refuse medical care.46 In common law this right was based
on the concepts of battery,47 informed consent,48 and bodily integrity;49
"even the touching of one person by another without consent... constitutes a
battery." 0 Justice Cardozo expounded these concepts (later quoted by the
Cruzan Court) as a justice on the Court of Appeals of New York: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body."51 Furthermore, the Cruzan Court deter-
mined that patients generally possess the right to refuse medical treatment.52
In concluding that a rational patient has the right to refuse medical
care, the Court borrowed a test from a prior case dealing with mental illness
and medical treatment. The Court already determined that under the Due
Process Clause a person has a "liberty interest" in what happens to his or
her body, but that determination does not end the inquiry. 54  Whether a pa-
tient's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by "bal-
ancing his [or her] liberty interests against the relevant state interests."
The Court also noted that the State's interest weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases.5 ' The
Court concluded that competent people have a very high liberty interest.5
46 See Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding that "it cannot be dis-
puted that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (finding that "the for-
cible injection of medication into a non-consenting person's body represents a substantial interference
with that person's liberty"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (holding that a "child, in common
with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment").
47 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 305
48 "Most Courts [since 1976] have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law
right to informed consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy right." Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 271.
49 Weber, supra note 15, at 372.
50 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
51 Id (quoting Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospitals, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
52 Id. at 270.
53 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 207 (1982).
54 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
55 d
56 Id at 270.
57 Id. at 278. "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id.
6
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III. VIRGINIA H.B. 462
A. Relevant Portions and History of the Law
Virginia's H.B. 462, which becomes effective on July 1, 2012, requires,
in pertinent part:
B. At least 24 hours before the performance of an abortion, a qualified medical
professional trained in sonography and working under the supervision of a phy-
sician licensed in the Commonwealth shall perform fetal transabdominal ultra-
sound imaging on the patient undergoing the abortion for the purpose of deter-
mining gestational age... The ultrasound image shall contain the dimensions of
the fetus and accurately portray the presence of external members and internal
organs of the fetus, if present or viewable.5 8
H.B. 462 was introduced by Rep. Kathy J. Byron of House District 22
and was co-sponsored by twenty-six other Republican representatives.59
The bill underwent several iterations before being passed, including one
that caused a significant amount of national controversy.60 The original ver-
sion of the bill required women at an early stage of pregnancy to have a
"transvaginal" ultrasound instead of a transabdominal one.61 The transvagi-
nal ultrasound would be performed by inserting a wand-like probe into the
woman's vagina to obtain an image of the fetus.62 After protests at the Vir-
ginia State Capitol, 3 several petitions,64 and nationally televised ridicule by
well-known comedians,5 the bill was amended to make the transvaginal
58 H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted), available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?121+mbr+HB462.
59 Id.
60 See Ian Duncan, Virginia Lawmakers Revise Controversial Abortion Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/25/nation/la-na-virginia-abortions-20120225.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Associated Press, Virginia Governor Signs Pre-Abortion Bill, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-07/virginia-abortion-ultrasound-bill/53401720.
64 Bob Lewis, Va. House Scraps Invasive Pre-Abortion Requirement, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Va-House-scraps-invasive-pre-abortion-
requirement-3352115.php.
65 The Daily Show With Jon Steiwart (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-february-21-2012/punanny-State---virginia-s-transvaginal-
ultrasound-bill (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); Saturday Night Live: Maya Rudolph (NBC television broad-
cast Feb. 18, 2012), available at htp://www.hulu.com/watch/331304/saturday-night-live-maya-rudolph
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (the criticism appeared during the "Weekend Update" segment at approxi-
mately the 34 minute mark); see Laura Vozella, Daily Show Mocks Virginia 's Ultrasound Bill, Wash-
ington Post, (Feb. 22, 2012 11:03AM), hftp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/va-
ultrasound-bill-gets-daily-show-mocking/2012/02/22/glQAoV2LTR blog.html.
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procedure optional."
B. H.B. 462 Is An Undue Burden to a Woman's Right to An Abortion
H.B. 462 is an undue burden on women under Casey for three rea-
sons, each hinging on the fact that the ultrasound is medically unneces-
sary.67 First, forcing a woman to have a medically unnecessary procedure
before she can have an abortion interferes with the doctor-patient relation-
ship." Second, because the procedure is medically unnecessary, it will not
be covered by insurance69 and will present undue financial hardship on
many women who seek to have an abortion. Finally, forcing a woman to
have a medically unnecessary sonogram before she can have an abortion
could present serious psychological issues for the woman.
Before most medical students become doctors, they take an oath
promising to uphold the dignity of their profession, protect their patients to
the best of their ability, and respect the scientific research of others in the
medical profession.70 The oath, attributed to the ancient Greek doctor Hip-
pocrates, creates a relationship between doctor and patient that has lasted
for more than two thousand years.71 While the tenets of the oath have
adapted to the modernization of medicine,72 the doctor's duty to his or her
patient remains the same.
According to Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN, doctors typically use ultra-
sounds to determine the gestational age of the fetus and to recognize any
potential pregnancy problems." Dr. Stone also states that a capable physi-
66 H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted), available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?121+mbr+HB462; see also Lewis, supra note 64.
67 Weber, supra note 15, at 368; Overviewi ofAbortion Laiws, supra note 5, at 1; Carlysle, supra note 15.6 8 JACK M. VALPEY, TESTIMONY OF JACK M. VALPEY, MD, MPH PHYSICIANS FOR REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE AND HEALTH 1-2 (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.prch.org/files/37 valpey.pdf; Rick
Ungar, Virginia's Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law, Medically Unsound Violates Guidelines ofAmerican
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, FORBES, Mar. 8, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/03/08/virginias-pre-abortion-ultrasound-law-medically-
unsound-violates-guidelines-of-american-college-of-obstetricians-and-gynecologists.
69 See Aetna, Inc., Clinical Policy Bulletin: Ultrasound for Pregnancy, AETNA.COM (last accessed Mar.
18, 2012), http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical/data/100_199/0199.html; see also Maya Dusenbery, Why
Virginia's New Mandatory Ultrasound Law, Still Sucks, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 3, 2012,
http://motherjones.com/majo/2012/03/why-virginias-new-mandatory-ultrasound-law-still-sucks.
70 See generally Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS, Mar. 27, 2001,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
71 National Institutes of Health, Greek Medicine-The Hippocratic Oath, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH (last accessed Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek oath.html.
72 See Tyson, supra note 68.
7 Weber, supra note 15, at 368 (quoting Telephone Interview with Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN (Oct. 3,
2008)).
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cian, in most cases, would be able to diagnose a situation requiring an abor-
tion simply by performing an external pelvic exam.7 In some instances,
however, the doctor may determine that an ultrasound is necessary before
an abortion can be performed.7 5 In those instances, the doctor would ex-
plain the situation to the patient, ask for consent, and then perform the ultra-
sound.76 H.B. 462 prevents doctors from using their medical expertise and
judgment in treating their patients; it prescribes a course of conduct that is
not supported by national medical standards and violates the doctors' rela-
tionships with their patients.77
The Casey Court specifically stated, "unnecessary health regulations
that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right."78 Re-
quiring a physician to perform an ultrasound when he or she knows that it is
superfluous is an unnecessary health regulation. On its face, the require-
ment does not directly prevent abortion,79 but, as discussed below, its effect
discourages women and their doctors from carrying out the procedure. This
obstacle is an undue burden and is thus unconstitutional.
Beyond interfering with the doctor-patient relationship, the ultra-
sound law will artificially drive up the out-of-pocket cost for abortions such
that they could become prohibitively expensive for many of the women
who seek them.0 According to the Guttmacher Institute, about half of the
pregnancies in the United States each year are unintended." One of the
highest rates of unintended pregnancies occurs among low-income wom-
en.82 The Guttmacher Institute also found that this socio-economic group
also has a high abortion rate. The abortion rate for minority women is also
elevated.84
According to Planned Parenthood, a first-trimester abortion per-
74 Id. at 368-69 (quoting Telephone Interview with Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN (Oct. 3, 2008)).
75 Id. at 369 (quoting Telephone Interview with Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN (Oct. 3, 2008)).
76 Id. (quoting Telephone Interview with Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN (Oct. 3, 2008)).
77 See Ungar, supra note 68.
78 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
79 See H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted); available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?121+mbr+HB462.
so See In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (last visited Mar. 18, 2012),
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures-4359.asp; see
also Oppose H.B. 462/SB 484 Mandatory Ultrasound, VIRGINIA PRO-CHOICE COALITION (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.ppav.org/images/Ultrasound -_OPPOSE HB462-SB 484 2012_.pdf
81 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN BRIEF: FACT SHEET: FACTS ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2012), hftp://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html.
82 Id. at 2.
83 Id. at 1.
84 Id. at 1, 12.
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formed at a health center usually costs between $300 and $950 .8 The cost
often increases for a second-trimester abortion or an abortion performed in
a hospital." Ultrasounds can add between $200 and $1,200 to the cost of
the procedure; because they are not medically necessary, the ultrasound
procedure may not be covered by insurance.87
The Casey Court specifically stated, "increased cost could become a
substantial obstacle" to a woman having an abortion." Additionally, to de-
termine whether a state regulation places an undue burden on a woman's
ability to have an abortion, courts must "examine the facts on a case-by-
case basis." 9 In the case of women living at or below the poverty line, an
additional $200 to $1,200 on top of the base cost of $300 to $950 is likely
to be prohibitively expensive if not covered by a private charity and could
prevent them from obtaining an abortion. In these types of cases, the cost
would absolutely be an undue burden for a woman trying to have an abor-
tion.
Finally, in passing H.B. 462, the Virginia Legislature failed to rec-
ognize the potentially harmful psychological effects of this forced medical
procedure on its recipients. Laws such as this one do not just provide "in-
formed consent" before abortion; they are also used to "morally Mirandize"
the woman in an effort to "arouse feelings of sin, guilt, and shame."90 The
ultrasound essentially "forc[es] women to feel guilty" about choosing a
specific healthcare option. 91
The decision to seek an abortion is very difficult for many women to
make and thus is a decision not often taken lightly. 2 Forcing a woman who
may be struggling with the decision to abort a pregnancy to have an ultra-
sound, a procedure that provides an image of the embryo, takes advantage
of her heightened emotional state. Furthermore, using an ultrasound as a
psychological weapon to discourage a woman from having an abortion
could lead to additional psychological trauma.9' The State has a clear inter-
85 In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, supra note 79.
86 Id
87 Oppose H.B. 462/SB 484 Mandatory Ultrasound, supra note 80.
88 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
89 See Weber, supra note 15, at 366 (paraphrasing Casey, 505 U.S. at 886).
90 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process Anti-
Discrimination Principle that Gives Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden" Standard of Review,
Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 259 (2001).
Valpey, supra note 68, at 2.
92 See Barry Rutherford, Having an Abortion is a Hard and Difficult Decision, HUBPAGES (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012), http://barryrutherford.hubpages.com/hub/Hard-decision-having-an-abortion; Real Voic-
es, ABORTION CONVERSATION PROJECT, INC. (last visited Mar. 18, 2012),
http://www.abortionconversation.com/realvoices.php.
93 Weber, supra note 15, at 370.
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est in maintaining its citizens' health.94 Putting a woman's mental health in
jeopardy with an unnecessary medical procedure is not in the State's inter-
est and fails the "undue burden" test.
C. H.B. 462 Violates a Woman's Right to Refuse Medical Care
As discussed above, the Supreme Court definitively established a
competent adult's right to refuse medical care.95 H.B. 462 is directly at
odds with this right. Medical care includes procedures, treatments, and
tests, 96 and an ultrasound is a medical procedure. The Cruzan Court based
its decision, in part, on the common-law tort of battery, which the Court ap-
plied to unauthorized touching by a physician. 97 In fact, "freedom from
unwanted medical attention is unquestionably among those principles 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental."' 98 Ostensibly, most women seeking abortions are competent
adults who are allowed to seek and refuse medical care as desired. Forcing
them to have an unnecessary medical procedure violates their constitution-
ally guaranteed right to reject medical treatment.
Informed consent also fits in this argument. In Casey, the majority rea-
soned that, "as with any medical procedure, the State may require a woman
to give her written informed consent to an abortion." 99 H.B. 462 acknowl-
edges this kind of informed consent00 but fails to recognize that the woman
has the right to give informed consent regarding any medical procedure to
which she is subjected. Under this law, the woman must consent to having
the ultrasound; there is no choice. This violates her right to refusal of med-
ical treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Virginia H.B. 462, like its counterparts in other states, is unconstitu-
tional. It violates the "undue burden" standard set out in Casey and it pre-
vents a woman from exercising her right to refuse medical treatment. Per
94 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) ("the State's legitimate interest in mater-
nal health").
95 Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). .
96 Id.
97 Id at 305.
98 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
100 H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted), available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+mbr+HB462.
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Casey, an undue burden is found when "a state regulation has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."'o
Forcing a woman to have a medically unnecessary procedure before she
can have an abortion is an undue burden in three ways. First, it violates the
doctor-patient relationship by requiring physicians to perform procedures
they wouldn't ordinarily perform and to knowingly perform a procedure
that could cause further emotional distress.'02 Second, requiring a medically
unnecessary ultrasound will drive up the cost of having an abortion to the
point that it could be prohibitively expensive to the people who need it
most.'o Unintended pregnancy and abortion disproportionately affects low-
income women. 10 4 By increasing the cost of an already-expensive proce-
dure1o5 by adding a medically unnecessary one not covered by insurance,10 6
the State could put abortion completely out of reach for a large population
of women. Finally, by forcing a woman to essentially take a picture of the
potential life growing inside her, the State forces further trauma on a wom-
an who is already in a heightened emotional state.'07
In addition to being an undue burden, H.B. 462 prevents women from
exercising their constitutionally protected right to refuse medical care. 0 s
Competent people have the right to refuse medical treatment under the
common law tradition of battery and the Due Process Clause.'09 The State
cannot force a competent person to be subjected to a medical procedure that
he or she does not want." 0 Unless the ultrasound is transvaginal, H.B. 462
does not give women the opportunity to opt out of the procedure."' If chal-
lenged in court, H.B. 462 cannot and should not be able to stand.
101 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
102 See Valpey, supra note 68; Ungar, supra note 68.
103 UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 81; In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, supra note 80; Oppose
HB. 462/SB 484 Mandatory Ultrasound, supra note 80.
104 UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 81.
105 In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, supra note 80.
106 Oppose HB. 462/SB 484 Mandatory Ultrasound, supra note 80.
107 Van Detta, supra note 90, at 259; Weber, supra note 15, at 370.
108 Cruzan v. Dir. of M. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
109 Id. at 269, 278.
110 Id.
H.B. 462, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (enacted); available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp6O4.exe?121+mbr+HB462.
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